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C
entral bank transparency is a topic discussed
almost as much as policy actions themselves.
Market participants have always wanted to
know the implications of policy actions for the
likely future course of monetary policy, but the
longstanding practice of central bank secrecy has
frustrated their search. In recent years, monetary
policymakers have disclosed much more than they
did in the past, partly because of growing interest
in being more accountable and partly because of
recognition that policy actions will be more effective
if the market understands them better.
Discussion of transparency has gone well beyond
the financial pages. The past decade has seen numer-
ous professional papers on transparency issues. In
this literature, transparency is taken to mean public
disclosure, and much of the discussion has centered
on questions such as: How specific should central
banks be about their policy objectives? Should they
announce the weights they apply to their inflation
and output stabilization objectives in conducting
monetary policy? Should central banks disclose
their economic forecasts? Should transcripts of the
policy debate be published and, if so, how soon?
Should policymaking meetings be televised?
My intent today is not to review the entire range
of transparency debates but instead to concentrate
on issues relating to the effects of monetary policy
information on markets and on the effectiveness
of monetary policy. I certainly do not believe that
political accountability issues are unimportant, but
my chosen topic is large enough to more than fully
exhaust the time available today.
Before proceeding, I want to emphasize that
the views I express here are mine and do not neces-
sarily reflect official positions of the Federal Reserve
System. I thank my colleagues at the Federal Reserve
Bank of St. Louis—especially Robert Rasche, senior
vice president and director of research, and Daniel
Thornton, vice president and economic advisor—
for their assistance and comments, but I retain full
responsibility for errors.
My plan is to proceed by first outlining my
model of how the economy works. That view is, I
believe, the essential starting place for a discussion
of transparency. I will then discuss two cases in
which, depending on what view you have, market
participants did not interpret Fed statements correctly
or the Fed did not communicate clearly. Under either
interpretation, there was some miscommunication. 
I will use “transparency” as shorthand for
accurately conveying accurate information including
all the information market participants need to form




Analysis of policy communication logically
begins with a description of the economic interaction
between the central bank and the markets. I’ve
provided my view of this interaction on several
occasions; here I provide just enough of a sketch
of this view to enable me to discuss communication
issues.1
At a highly abstract level, I believe that the
appropriate model of the economy is that markets
behave in an efficient, fully informed way. Equilib-
rium requires that market participants form accurate
expectations about the behavior of the central bank.
The economy will function most efficiently if central
bank policy has two features. First, the central bank
must have clearly understood, appropriate, and
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 feasible objectives. Second, the central bank must
have a highly regular and predictable policy rule or
response pattern that links policy actions to the state
of the economy, including all information relevant
to assessing the economy’s probable future course.
Pushing the idea of a full rational expectations equi-
librium one step further, there should be a political
equilibrium in which the central bank pursues
objectives broadly accepted in society. Without
broad political support, monetary policy objectives
are subject to change through normal democratic
processes and such change, or the prospect of it,
adds to uncertainty about future monetary policy.
With regard to objectives, the Federal Open
Market Committee (FOMC) has stated repeatedly
that one of its objectives is a low and stable rate of
inflation. Although the FOMC has not quantified
that target, for present purposes it is useful to dis-
cuss communications issues as if the FOMC had
announced a specific target. Put another way, with
regard to market behavior I believe that the difference
between an explicit target and one inferred from
FOMC decisions is minimal today and has been for
some years.
The FOMC also has the objective of maximum
possible stability of output and employment. Taken
together, low inflation and output stability along
the economy’s growth path are believed to contribute
to maximum possible economic growth over time.
Because of its importance to output and employ-
ment stability, it is also useful to point explicitly to
the objective of financial stability. Stabilizing policy
responses to severe market disruptions such as a
stock market crash or a liquidity crisis further con-
tribute to fostering maximum possible economic
growth.
The FOMC implements policy by setting the
intended federal funds rate. As is well known, a
central bank cannot achieve a stable outcome for
the economy if it pegs the interest rate at an inappro-
priate level for any length of time. Thus, the central
bank must change its interest rate target from time
to time to achieve its objectives. 
In my abstract model of the economy, the market
and the central bank have the same information
base; neither has an informational advantage. As
new information arrives, the appropriate interest
rate to achieve policy objectives may change. Given
my assumption that the market and the central
bank have the same information, all players respond
the same way to the arrival of new information.
The central bank determines the appropriate policy
response knowing that the market also has the same
information and understands its implications for
the economy and for policy actions.
At a highly abstract level, I believe that this model
accurately describes the way the U.S. economy has
been working in recent years. As we add more and
more detail to the model, we find areas in which
the equilibrium is not complete. Thus, my view is
that the economy has been converging toward a
full rational expectations macroeconomic equilib-
rium, but is not all the way there as yet. In particular,
over the past quarter century there has been enor-
mous progress in improving the clarity of the Fed’s
objectives and in the Fed’s discipline in pursuing
the objectives. With regard to the inflation objective,
there is a world of difference between today’s situa-
tion and that prevailing in the 1970s.
There has also been enormous progress in pro-
vision of more accurate and timely information
about policy actions. The FOMC announces its policy
actions on the afternoon of the conclusion of each
regularly scheduled meeting and promptly after
any interim meeting. The Fed is more open in many
other ways as well; for example, the FOMC now
releases a policy statement at the conclusion of its
meeting and dissents, if any, are also disclosed at
that time. 
My fundamental conception of the Fed’s commu-
nication challenge is to further the progress toward
a more complete rational expectations equilibrium.
Put another way, my question is this: How might
the Fed modify its communications strategy so that
the market can converge on a rational expectations
equilibrium with less error than we observe today? 
MISCOMMUNICATION—TWO CASES
It is instructive to consider examples in which
communications were less clear than they might
have been and to analyze how such problems might
be avoided in the future. Communications successes
are also worth studying. There is a growing literature
along these lines, such as analysis of the market
effects of the change in FOMC practice in February
1994 to immediate disclosure of policy decisions
at the conclusion of FOMC meetings.
Accurate communication is far more difficult
than it seems at first glance. Complete accuracy
requires that speaker and listener interpret actions
and words the same way. In a normal conversation,
individuals have an opportunity to clear up ambigu-
ity by raising questions about intended meaning. It
is possible to ask for clarification, or ask again, before
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other officials as well) say, however, can have imme-
diate market impact; market participants may act
before ambiguities or miscommunication can be
corrected. This fact imposes special burdens on
central bankers.
To illustrate how difficult the communications
process is in the central bank context, let me relate
to you an exercise I go through at the end of each
FOMC meeting. Before the decisions of the meeting
are made public, I estimate—“guess” is a much bet-
ter word—the market reaction to the policy action
and press release that are made public at 2:15 p.m.
after the meeting. Then I listen to the radio or a
cable news channel to determine how the bond
and stock markets respond. Ordinarily, but not
always, I get the direction of the market responses
correct, but my estimates of the magnitudes of the
market reactions are often wide of the mark. My
personal experience is that I find it exceedingly
difficult to predict how people will interpret policy
actions and the nuances of the press release. I sus-
pect that other FOMC participants perform similar
exercises, though I have not asked any of them. 
I’ve sometimes thought I should keep a formal
record of my market predictions, but have not yet
decided to do so. It could be a sobering exercise
for all FOMC members to maintain such a record.
Communication is obviously imperfect if the
speaker—the FOMC in this case—cannot predict
accurately how listeners will respond.
Now consider two specific examples of FOMC
communications that I believe were misread. The
first is the evolution in the announcement of the “tilt”
in the directive, and the second is the communica-
tion last May about “an unwelcome substantial fall
in inflation.” I emphasize that I’m offering my per-
sonal interpretation of these cases; other FOMC
members may have different interpretations.
In the early 1980s the FOMC began to vote on
language pertaining to possible future policy actions.
This language was alternatively called the “tilt,”
“bias,” or “symmetry” of the policy directive. The
language was generally regarded as applying to
possible policy action through the period ending at
the next FOMC meeting. Historically, the FOMC did
not release this language until the minutes of that
meeting were published (subsequent to the next
regularly scheduled FOMC meeting). That meant
that the statement, when released, had no informa-
tion value about the probable direction of policy
actions because the statement referred to a period
already past. 
In an effort to be more transparent, the Commit-
tee decided in December 1998 that it would release
the tilt language immediately with its policy action
at the conclusion of a meeting when it expected
the information to be particularly important. The
minutes of that meeting, released in late January
1999, contain a paragraph on the Committee’s 
discussion of a disclosure policy. A key passage from
the minutes reads as follows:
Nonetheless, the members decided to imple-
ment the previously stated policy of releasing,
on an infrequent basis, an announcement
immediately after certain FOMC meetings
when the stance of monetary policy
remained unchanged. Specifically, the
Committee would do so on those occasions
when it wanted to communicate to the
public a major shift in its views about the
balance of risks or the likely direction of
future policy. Such announcements would
not be made after every change in the sym-
metry of the directive, but only when it
seemed important for the public to be aware
of an important shift in the members’ views.
At the conclusion of the meeting in May 1999,
the FOMC for the first time released a statement
that included the “tilt” in the policy directive. The
formal statement referred to “the federal funds
operating objective during the intermeeting period.”
Many members of the FOMC believed that the market
overreacted to the May tilt statement and to subse-
quent tilt statements as well. The statements did
attract considerable attention, and market analysts
began to speculate about changes in the intended
funds rate at future FOMC meetings based on the
tilt, or symmetry, announced by the FOMC. 
The market reaction to the statement released
immediately after the May 1999 FOMC meeting
should not, perhaps, have been a surprise to the
Committee. The Committee had said, after all, in
its the minutes of the December 1998 meeting that
it would make such an announcement “when it
wanted to communicate to the public a major shift
in its views...”
In an attempt to clarify its communications,
the FOMC established a subcommittee to review
both its policy directive and the public announce-
ment following FOMC meetings. Communications
practice changed in two respects. First, the FOMC
would issue a statement after every meeting. That
step eliminated the possibility that the mere exis-
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 tence of a statement would be treated as an unusual
event signaling a major change in policy. 
The second step was a new “balance-of-risks”
statement that assessed the outlook for price stability
and sustainable economic growth in the foreseeable
future. Despite the FOMC’s stated intention that its
new “balance-of-risks” was not to be interpreted as
an indictor of future FOMC actions, the evidence
suggests that it was one of the pieces of information
that market analysts did use to form expectations
of a likely near-term policy action.2 My perception,
however, is that the balance-of-risks language did
not come to have a completely settled meaning in
the market.
For my second example, consider the statement
following the FOMC meeting last May that referred
to “an unwelcome substantial fall in inflation.” In
subsequent commentary in the financial press, this
statement was interpreted to mean one or more of
the following things: (i) A cut in the intended funds
rate at the June 2003 meeting was likely. (ii) Any
increase in the intended funds rate within the next
year was highly unlikely. (iii) The FOMC would imple-
ment “unconventional monetary policy actions”
such as aggressively purchasing long-term Treasury
bonds. Interpretation (iii) gained force and a major
rally in long-term Treasury markets ensued, driving
the 10-year Treasury rate to a more-than-40-year
low of 3.13 percent. 
Speaking strictly for myself, I believe there are
two important points that the statement of May 6
tried to communicate that didn’t really come across.
First, inflation has now receded to a level where for
the first time in 40 years inflation risks are symmet-
ric: From the current inflation rate neither sustained
increases nor sustained decreases are desirable.
Second, in the words of my FOMC colleague
Governor Bernanke, “FOMC behavior and rhetoric
have suggested to many observers that the Commit-
tee does have an implicit preferred range for inflation.
Most relevant here, the bottom of that preferred
range clearly seems to be a value greater than zero
measured inflation, at least 1 percent or so.”3 On
several occasions in the past I have stated that my
preferred inflation target is zero inflation, properly
measured. Since I believe that the major price
indices employed today are subject to some upward
bias and measurement error, the goal “zero inflation,
properly measured” translates into a low, positive
measured rate of inflation. In my judgment, 1 percent
measured inflation for the consumption price index
is in the neighborhood of price stability as I define it.
To me, though, an announcement that inflation
is now down to an appropriate long-run target should
not by itself have led to a sharp decline in the 10-year
bond rate. What I think happened was that the
market, seeing that the intended federal funds rate
was down to 1 percent, thought that the Fed was
running out of room to implement policy through
setting a target federal funds rate. If the Fed were to
switch to setting a target for long-term interest rates,
then such a policy would reduce or eliminate for a
time downside price risk on long-term Treasury
bonds. That would justify bidding the 10-year bond
price up (the rate down), because the price risk would
become one-sided—bond prices could go up but
not down, or at least not down by very much very
soon. Over time, however, the market came to
believe that the FOMC was not contemplating the
need for an unconventional policy in the near term,
and bond prices fell. Indeed, bond yields backed
up to a level above where they had been just before
the May FOMC meeting.
DISCLOSURE STRATEGY
Given my emphasis on the economic purpose
of disclosure, I see no room for merely satisfying
curiosity about what goes on in FOMC meetings.
The general nature of what goes on in meetings can
easily be inferred by reading meeting transcripts,
which are released with a five-year lag. The appro-
priate communications goal, in the context of how
the economy functions, should be to minimize mar-
ket uncertainty about monetary policy. It is important
to emphasize that uncertainty about future monetary
policy actions cannot be eliminated because those
actions depend critically on information that cannot
itself be predicted. What needs to be minimized,
therefore, is uncertainty about central bank responses
to new information. 
I’m going to concentrate my discussion on the
policy statement issued at the conclusion of each
FOMC meeting, but some of my comments have
broader applicability. The communication at the
conclusion of each FOMC meeting is a critical one
because market participants are primed to react to
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ment is necessarily short and it sets the stage for
FOMC members to provide subsequent, more thor-
ough discussions of policy. I’ll concentrate on two
aspects of the statement. The first is the extent to
which the statement should provide a forecast in
some form of future policy actions, and the second
is the structure of the statement itself.
Given my rational expectations macroeconomic
model and my desire to create a more complete
equilibrium—an equilibrium in which expectations
errors are minimized—the central communications
issue is to explain to the market the nature of the
policy rule that determines how new information
feeds into policy actions designed to achieve as
closely as possible the central bank’s policy objec-
tives. Achieving clarity with respect to policy
objectives is actually quite simple compared with
explaining the nature of the policy rule.
The fundamental problem is that there is no
policy rule by which we can calculate the appro-
priate policy action from observed data. There is
instead a regularity to policy of the sort “you know
it when you see it.” 
Sometimes we observe a striking change in
some particular variable, such as the unemployment
rate, that all but demands a policy response. Most
of the time, though, policy actions flow from an
accumulation of data, most of which point in the
same direction. It just is not easy to describe “you
know it when you see it.” I would be absolutely
delighted if researchers could provide a quantified
policy rule, at least as a base case. The rule suggested
by John Taylor is helpful, but very incomplete. I
think it unfortunate that we have not seen in the
professional literature an evolution of a policy rule
that builds substantially on the work begun by Taylor.
But the problem is a very difficult one; for one thing,
it is necessary from time to time to discount changes
in an important economic variable because of sus-
pected anomalies in the statistics themselves.
Thus, we have to live with the unfortunate fact
that the monetary policy world is one of “I’ll know
it when I see it.” We need to keep that fact in mind
when designing communications policy.
Explaining a policy action—elucidating the
considerations that led the FOMC to decide to adjust
the intended funds rate, or to leave it unchanged—
is worthwhile. Over time, the accumulation of such
explanations helps the market, and perhaps the
FOMC itself, to understand what the policy regular-
ities are. It is also important to understand that
many—perhaps most—policy actions have prece-
dent value. If the FOMC takes action A in circum-
stances X, the next time circumstances X arise the
FOMC should also take action A, or have good reason
not to do so. One of the advantages of public dis-
closure of the reasons for policy actions is that the
required explanation forces the FOMC to think
through what it is doing and why.
Discussing future policy actions is a different
matter. In my view of the world, future policy actions
are almost entirely contingent on the arrival of
new information. For that reason, I believe that an
FOMC forecast, or tilt, toward a specific future policy
action is more likely to be misleading to the market
than helpful. It is true that at the conclusion of a
meeting I have a sense of the probabilities of various
future policy actions, and I suspect that other FOMC
members think about the policy process the same
way. I might believe, for example, that new informa-
tion would be very unlikely to lead me to want to
raise the intended funds rate at the next meeting
but might, in combination with information already
known, make the case for cutting the intended
rate. And I might assign a probability to a future cut
of 0.5, or 0.3, or some other value. But even in this
situation I would not want to rule out an increase
in the intended rate, for I can certainly imagine
new information that would compel an increase.
Question: Could the FOMC as a practical matter
decide on the probability and convey that probability
accurately to the market? My own view is that only
rarely could the FOMC agree on what the probability
should be, and even then it would be extremely
difficult to convey that probability to the market.
Moreover, if the probability is high, it seems to me
that in most cases it would make more sense to
simply take the policy action at the current meeting
rather than broadcast it as likely at the next meeting.
The old “tilt” language caused problems, I think,
precisely because different FOMC members had
different interpretations of what probabilities
attached to what words. And I think the market view
was, at least sometimes, that if the FOMC chose to
change the bias, it must be doing so to announce a
significant probability of future policy action. I think
some observers also tend to react as follows: If the
probability is high, why shouldn’t the FOMC act
now? If the probability is low, why talk about it? If
the probability is in a middle range, will disclosing
the tilt help the market to price securities more
efficiently—that is, more in line with the true likeli-
hood of future policy action? 
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 Furthermore, the tilt language was sometimes
used in an effort to reduce the number of dissents
in the FOMC. In this case, the language may have
provided inaccurate information, because the
majority may not have believed that there was any
significant probability of future policy action in the
direction indicated.
Another problem is that of acting consistently
with guidance about the probable direction of
future policy. Sometimes new information arrives
that is clearly compelling in the direction of not
acting in accordance with the guidance. A forecast
of a policy action, made before the new informa-
tion arose, may then have created a dilemma for a
central bank. The central bank then either breaks
what the market regards as a commitment or lives
up to the commitment at the cost of ignoring new
information calling for a different policy action.
However, more often information will be indecisive;
once guidance is announced, the burden of proof
tends to shift toward showing why the forecasted
action is inadvisable, whereas without guidance
the burden of proof tends toward justifying an action.
All in all, then, I’ve come to the view that FOMC
language forecasting future policy actions is probably
counterproductive in most circumstances. I do not,
however, rule out the desirability of forecasting
future policy in some cases given that the rational
expectations model from which I am reasoning is
clearly an abstraction. What I think we need to do
is to analyze the circumstances under which the
abstract model provides misleading guidance with
respect to communications strategy.
It is true that policy works in part by changing
expectations and therefore the term structure of
interest rates; that is the basic argument favoring
disclosure of future policy direction. However, the
crux of the matter is this: If the market fully under-
stands the policy rule, or policy regularity, and has
the same information the FOMC has, then an FOMC
forecast of future policy direction is useless informa-
tion because it is redundant. If the market and the
Fed have the same information, then the market can
determine the probabilities that new information
will arrive pointing toward future policy actions.
Understanding policy objectives and the policy rule,
the market can put itself inside the Fed’s head and
make the same guesses the Fed can make.
If information on the Fed’s thinking about its
future policy direction is not redundant, then that
fact alone does not necessarily call for the Fed to
forecast future policy actions. The issue for me is
quite different. If the market doesn’t see what I see,
why not? What is the market missing, and what do
we make of the fact? Perhaps the better course would
be to disclose the underlying information the market
is apparently missing, or call attention to informa-
tion the market is neglecting. That to me is a better
strategy than hinting at an unconditional policy
direction, because the essence of what the market
needs to know is not the intended federal funds rate
in six weeks. What the market needs to know is the
policy response function by which the central bank
acts in a consistent way over time and one that is
efficient in fostering success in achieving policy
objectives.
This discussion assumes that the market is
missing something. But, could the problem be that
the market sees something I do not? How can I be
so sure that I know the appropriate direction for
future policy actions? If it is the Fed that is missing
something and not the market, then disclosing a
policy tilt will clearly be misleading, or the odds are
that it will turn out to be misleading.
Historically, the FOMC (and other central banks)
went to great lengths to avoid providing guidance
about future policy direction. Indeed, one of the
arguments that the Fed used in the defense of secrecy
in the Merrill case in 1975 was that the immediate
release of the information in the directive or in FOMC
deliberations would produce expectations that would
destabilize financial markets. That argument is
incomplete at best. Some disclosures clearly stabilize
rather than destabilize markets; secrecy can create
incorrect market guesses about what the Fed is doing.
One such case arose on Thanksgiving eve 1989,
when the Open Market Desk intervened to supply
reserves for technical reasons. At this time there
was no announcement of the intended funds rate.
The intervention was widely interpreted by market
participants as a signal that the FOMC had reduced
its target for the federal funds rate from around 8.50
to about 8.25 percent. It took several trading days
before the market sorted out the confusion. On this
occasion secrecy produced unnecessary volatility
in financial markets. Numerous other examples
provide convincing evidence, in my view, that, in
general, disclosure of actual policy actions is stabiliz-
ing rather than destabilizing. But it is not appropriate
to generalize from the value of immediate disclosure
of policy actions to disclosure of “everything.”
To discuss the format of the policy statement at
the conclusion of each FOMC meeting, I’ll start with
an observation. Suppose the statement is confined
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of language and the importance of word order in
conveying meaning yield the result that the state-
ment contains an enormous range of possibilities.
The multiplicity of possible meanings is made even
larger since each statement is read against the back-
drop of the previous one. Thus, what is relevant is
not just word choice and order but changes from
the previous statement.
As an aside, the importance of statement changes
can make it difficult to improve the statement over
time. To avoid misinterpretation of changes, it is best
if a changed approach or format can be announced
in advance so that the change in approach is clearly
separated from a change in policy.
If the statement is to convey policy intent accu-
rately and with minimal ambiguity—surely desirable
characteristics in terms of minimizing expectational
errors in the market—then the number of possible
meanings must be narrowed in some way. One way
would be for the FOMC to chose among a relatively
few standard phrases, at least in language providing
a summary statement of the policy stance.
Some will regard this approach as providing
“boilerplate” language with little real meaning. My
own judgment is that it is better to provide boiler-
plate with clear meaning than rich language with a
multiplicity of possible meanings. It just is not true
that lots of words equals lots of disclosure and
greater transparency. 
Because the market responds immediately to
policy actions and statements, it is important that
the FOMC not find itself in the position of having to
clarify its statements to correct misinterpretations;
explaining the explanation can add to uncertainty
and raise questions about future policy statements,
which market participants might come to expect to
be clarified or interpreted. The best way to avoid
these problems is to narrow the range of phrases
used in the statement.
As I explained earlier, my view is that the state-
ment should concentrate on explaining the policy
action and its rationale, and not hint at future policy
actions. Given information available at the time of
a meeting, I believe that the standing assumption
should be that the policy action at the meeting is
expected to position the stance of policy appropri-
ately. The purpose of the statement should be to
explain why the policy action, or lack of action, has
positioned policy appropriately given the informa-
tion available.
As a matter of logic, the current balance-of-risks
language creates some ambiguity. If risks are assessed
as unbalanced, why was policy not adjusted further
to create a balance going forward? A possible answer
is that an unbalanced risk assessment foreshadows
future policy action. But the “tilt” interpretation of
an unbalanced risk assessment seems at odds with
the rationale for substituting the balance-of-risks
language for the previous tilt language. What would
be clearer, I think, would be to use the balance-of-
risks language to explain that information since the
previous meeting indicated that risks were becoming
unbalanced in a particular way, and for that reason
the FOMC adjusted the intended federal funds rate.
Separating growth risks from inflation risks, as
in the May statement, makes a lot of sense. When
employment change and inflation data are plotted
in a scatter diagram, all four quadrants contain lots
of observations. Sometimes employment and infla-
tion rise together, or fall together. However, just about
as often the two variables move in opposite direc-
tions. Because all four quadrants are populated, a
summary policy judgment has to be communicated
indicating the FOMC’s weighting of the risks. It is
relatively easy to explain that a policy tightening
was occasioned by a rising risk of higher inflation
and stronger employment growth; but when employ-
ment growth and inflation are headed in opposite
directions, the summary policy language needs to
indicate that the FOMC acted, or didn’t, because it
gave more weight to the inflation risk than the
employment risk, or vice versa. The issue is not, by
the way, that inflation risk is more or less important
than employment risk, but rather that current infor-
mation might suggest that recent employment
changes, say, are transitory.
This discussion makes clear that a minimally
accurate summary statement explaining a mone-
tary policy action is still pretty complicated. The
FOMC must weigh inflation risks, employment
risks, and form a judgment balancing or weighting
the two risks. Beyond that, from time to time spe-
cial factors will intrude, such as the tragic events of
9/11 or unusual liquidity crises.
CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
Transparency is a worthy goal, but improving
transparency is hard work. My thinking is still
evolving, but one thing I know is that the more I
consider the issue the harder it seems. 
I’ve tried to present a framework for thinking
about how to improve transparency. I start with a
view of the world based on a standard rational
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 expectations macroeconomic model. An efficient
equilibrium requires that the markets understand
what the central bank is doing. The communications
challenge for the central bank is to explain more
thoroughly and completely what it is doing. That
means, above all, explaining how new information
feeds into policy actions. I have a lot of skepticism
about forecasting future policy actions because
they properly flow from new information that is
not itself predictable.
Accurate communication requires settled
meanings for words. For any given word, we can
consult a dictionary and we usually discover that
each English word has several meanings, which
can be quite different. There is no dictionary in
which we can look up the several meanings of a
paragraph. The meaning of a policy statement—
preferably only one—must be established by the
central bank, through consistent practice over time
and through more extended discussion of what the
language means. 
I think it fair to say that systematic study of the
how of transparency is in its infancy, and I hope that
my remarks here spark others to analyze these issues.
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